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Abstract 
In this paper we analyse the impact of the EU multi-level co-
financing system on regional policy-making and priority setting 
taking the case of the agri-environmental programme of Saxony-
Anhalt. The implications of several co-financing scenarios are ana-
lysed and compared to respective lump-sum transfers using an 
interactive linear programming approach. The results reveal how 
regional choices on agri-environmental measures are influenced by 
the co-financing system leading to distortions. The extent of these 
distortions depends on the specific regional preferences and re-
strictions. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag untersucht den Einfluss der Kofinanzierung innerhalb 
des Mehrebenensystems der EU auf die regionale Politikgestaltung 
und Prioritätensetzung anhand des Agrarumweltprogramms Sach-
sen-Anhalts. Dazu wird ein interaktiver linearer Programmierung-
sansatz genutzt, mit dem verschiedene Szenarien der Kofinan-
zierung mit Szenarien verglichen werden, in denen dem Bundesland 
entsprechende Pauschalbeträge zur Verfügung stehen. Die Ergeb-
nisse zeigen, dass die Entscheidungssituation durch das bestehen-
de System der Kofinanzierung beeinflusst und verzerrt wird. Das 
Ausmaß der Verzerrung ist abhängig von den spezifischen regiona-
len Präferenzen und Restriktionen. 
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1.  Introduction 
Within the European Union (EU), a multi-level co-
financing system for structural, agricultural and rural de-
velopment policies has been developed, sharing decision-
making and financial responsibilities at different political 
levels (e.g. EU, Germany and German federal states 
“Länder”) (MEHL and PLANKL, 2001: 173). From a regional 
perspective this system certainly provides incentives for a 
higher allocation of funds to specific policy areas. On the 
other hand regional policy-making may be distorted due to 
co-financing incentives. 
The EU co-financing system has been criticised, in particu-
lar based on the economic theory of federalism (MEHL and 
PLANKL, 2001: 174; POSTLEP and DÖRING, 1996: 27). The 
criticism is mainly related to the violation of the principle 
of fiscal equivalence. This principle postulates that there 
has to be a congruence between those who benefit from 
measures and those who have to take the financial respon-
sibility (OLSON, 1969: 483; LAASER and STEHN, 1996: 63). 
A violation of this principle can lead to oversupply as well 
as undersupply of goods or special services (RUDLOFF, 
2002: 242; OLSON, 1986: 123). According to URFEI (1999: 
237) and RUDLOFF (2002: 246) most of the agri-environ-
mental programmes violate the principle of fiscal equiva-
lence. 
In this paper we discuss the implications of the EU multi-
level co-financing system taking the budgeting for the agri-
environmental programme in Saxony-Anhalt as a case 
study. We show how the volume and the allocation of funds 
for different agri-environmental measures is influenced by 
this system as compared to an undistorted lump-sum trans-
fer scenario. The paper uses an interactive linear program-
ming approach, which has originally been developed for a 
case study in Saxony-Anhalt (KIRSCHKE et al., 2004a und 
2004b). 
2.  Regional policy-making in a multi-level 
system 
2.1 The institutional framework 
Agri-environmental programmes are funded by the EU 
since the McSharry Reform in 1992 and the regulations of 
the AGENDA 2000 strengthened the position of agri-
environmental policies. When the case study for Saxony-
Anhalt was carried out, the institutional framework of   
the agri-environmental programmes was defined by the 
“Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999”. 
As a consequence of the mid-term review of the 
AGENDA 2000, some adaptations were realised with the 
Luxembourg decisions (“Council Regulation (EC) No 
1783/2003 of 29 September 2003”). 
In the period considered the EU contribution covered 75% 
of the expenditures for agri-environmental measures in 
“objective 1 regions” and 50% in the other regions. Accord-
ing to the Luxembourg decisions the financial contribution 
to agri-environmental measures has been raised to 85% in 
“objective 1 regions” and to 60% in other regions. 
In the federal system in Germany the institutional frame-
work for rural development additionally is subject to the 
“Joint Action for Improvement of Agrarian Structures and 
for Coast Preservation (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesse-
rung der Agrarstruktur und des Küstenschutzes, GAK)”. 
Within the framework of the GAK, federal grants are pro-
vided for measures which are based on the “Principles of 
market-oriented and locally adapted land cultivation (Markt- Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 7 
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und standortangepasste Landbewirtschaftung, MSL)”. Fed-
eration and federal states share the funding of such meas-
ures at the ratio of 60% (federation) and 40% (federal 
state). Other measures, which are not part of the GAK, do 
not receive federal grants. 
URFEI (1999: 140) characterised this mixed co-financing 
system of agri-environmental measures between EU, federa-
tion, and federal states as follows: 
• The EU has a high financial responsibility and a low 
impact on the objectives.  
• The federation has a strong impact on the objectives and a 
small share in total financing. 
• The federal states have the biggest impact on the objec-
tives, decision-making, and on the development of agri-
environmental measures, while the financial responsibility 
is very small. 
When the case study was carried out there were the follow-
ing conditions in Saxony-Anhalt, which is an “objective 1” 
region: the EU covered 75%, the federation covered 15%, 
and Saxony-Anhalt covered 10% of the expenditures on 
MSL-measures. For the other measures the EU and the 
federal states shared the expenditures at the ratio of 75% 
and 25%. The structure of co-financing and the intergov-
ernmental grants are of no direct importance for farmers 
taking part in agri-environmental programmes. However, 
there are important implications for the regional budget and 
regional policy-making as will be shown in the following 
chapters. 
2.2 The linear programming approach 
The following analysis is based on an interactive linear 
programming approach which was developed for support-
ing budgeting decisions about the agri-environmental pro-
gramme of Saxony-Anhalt (KIRSCHKE et al., 2004a und 
2004b). In order to decide about priorities and to determine 
budget allocations, relevant political measures need to be 
chosen, consensus about the most important objectives 
needs to be reached amongst stakeholders, the impact of 
measures on the objectives has to be assessed, and relevant 
restrictions for decision-making have to be considered. 
This task can be tackled step by step in discussions with 
stakeholders and decision-makers using the method of inter-
active programming. KIRSCHKE and JECHLITSCHKA (2002, 
2003) as well as JECHLITSCHKA, KIRSCHKE and SCHWARZ 
(2007) report how to implement a linear programming 
approach in MS-Excel© for formulating structural and agri-
environmental programmes. 
Under the assumption of constant marginal and average 
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with: 
Z1 objective  1 
Bi  budgetary expenses for measure i 
i = 1, ..., n  Index of agri-environmental measures considered 
z1i  constant marginal and average coefficient of the 
objective function describing the impact of the 
budgetary expenses for measure i on objective 1. 
For considering two objectives, an aggregated objective 
function can be formulated as follows: 
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with (1-α) and α being weighting factors and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. 
Hence, the programming approach can be formulated as 
follows: 
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where:  
r = 1, ..., m  index of restrictions (equations or inequalities) 
ari  coefficient of restriction r for measure i 
br  right hand side of restriction r. 
The idea of interactive programming is to develop and use 
such a linear programming model in a communication 
process using the knowledge and the assumptions of rele-
vant actors. The aim is to support the decision-making 
process and to increase the transparency of underlying 
assumptions for the results. The approach also helps to 
facilitate the learning process of actors and policy makers, 
thus improving the basis for decision-making. The perspec-
tive is not to replace decision-making of actors and policy 
makers coming up with “an optimal policy” (GEURTS and 
JOLDERSMA, 2001; WALKER et al., 2001; MUNDA, 2004), 
but to support actors and policy-makers in an effective way. 
The modelling approach, used for the calculations in this 
article, was applied to design the agri-environmental pro-
gramme of Saxony-Anhalt for the financial period from 
2004 to 2008. It has been developed and used in several 
workshops based on the assumptions of stakeholders and 
decision-makers in the region. In the following a brief out-
line of the specific model structure is given which is also 
illustrated in table 1. 
Nine groups of measures have been used as activities in the 
modelling approach which consist of several single meas-
ures each. Thus, the modelling approach was used to con-
sider the strategic situation on an aggregated level. The 
measures are defined as follows: 
• general extensive grassland use (including all grassland of 
the farm) (M1); 
• specific extensive grassland use (single grassland areas 
and sheep grazing) (M2); 
• specific extensive grassland use (single grassland areas 
and cattle grazing) (M3); 
• organic farming (M4). 
These measures belong to the group called “Market-
oriented and locally adapted land management” (MSL) 
(MLU, 2003). Another measure is: 
• Environmental protective cultivation of special cultures 
(vegetables, medicinal and spice herbs, pip and stone fruit 
as well as vine and hop) (M5) (MLU, 2002a). 
And finally, special nature conservation measures (VNS – 
“Vertragsnaturschutz”) are considered (MLU, 2002b): Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 7 
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• management of grassland (M6); 
• management of ancient orchards (M7); 
• management of crop land (M8); 
• management of set aside land (M9). 
Two objectives have been defined: “Environmental Quality” 
and “Preservation of Agricultural Labour”. In order to assess 
the coefficients of the objective function, questionnaires 
have been used in which the stakeholders have been asked 
to give their estimates on a scale between one (very low 
impact) and nine (very high impact). The results have been 
subject to discussion after which the slightly adjusted 
means of the estimates have been used as coefficients. 
The following restrictions have been defined: 
• Budget restrictions, like upper and lower bounds for the 
budget volumes for single measures (table 1, row 6 and 7). 
The upper bounds for M2 to M5 and M7 reflect the 
maximum possible budget for each measure, based on the 
information of decision-makers. For M1, M6, M8, and 
M9 upper bounds have been set arbitrarily at a high level 
in order to better identify possible trade-offs between 
measures. 
• A restriction for the available regional budget of Saxony-
Anhalt (table 1, row 8). The coefficients of this restriction 
vary according to the different levels of co-financing. Fol-
lowing the discussions on the workshops for the specific 
case of agri-environmental planning in Saxony-Anhalt, it 
was assumed that the amount of external co-financing 
funds is not limited and thus not binding in the model. 
• An upper and a lower bound for the total area of grassland 
used by measures. The total bound is based on the avail-
able grassland area in Saxony-Anhalt; the lower bound 
takes into account the additional policy objective to sup-
port grassland (table 1, row 9 and 10). 
Table 1 shows the input matrix of the reference situation. 
The tentative proposal for a budget allocation and starting-
point for the discussions is displayed in row 2. The optimal 
allocation for α = 0,5 (formula 3) resulting from the   
programming approach in the depicted basic situation   
is displayed in row 3. The upper bounds are binding for  
the measures M2, M4, M5, and M7, according to the   
restrictions in Saxony-Anhalt. Furthermore, M3 gets 
10.57 Mio. Euro (€), M6 gets 15.51 Mio. €, and the meas-
ures M1, M8, and M9 are not financed at all. The upper 
bound for the regional budget of Saxony-Anhalt is set at 
7.73 Mio. €, which is binding, as well as the upper bound 
for grassland. 
3.  Implications of the multi-level  
co-financing system 
The budget allocation of the basic model described in the 
last chapter can now be defined as reference situation in 
order to analyse the consequences of varying assumptions 
and different co-financing scenarios. The budget allocation 
of the reference situation is displayed in figure 1. 
It is clear that the EU multi-level co-financing system ex-
tends the financial budget for the agri-environmental pro-
gramme in Saxony-Anhalt. Figure 2 illustrates a budget 
allocation of the agri-environmental programme based on 
regional funds only. For this analysis the coefficients of the 
regional budget have been set to 1. The lower bound of 
grassland use has been reduced from 20,000 ha to 5,000 ha, 
because there is no feasible solution above a bound of 
14,000  ha. Without any restriction for grassland use, or-
ganic farming (M4) would be the only financed measure. 
For rising levels of the lower bound of grassland use, how-
ever, M4 is increasingly substituted by M2, as this measure 
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Upper bound for
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for grassland (ha)
23.0 mio. € 20.0 mio. €
Tentative proposal for allocation 
2004-2008 (mio. €)
Objective coefficients
for obj. 1 (weight: 0.5)
Objective coefficients
for obj. 2 (weight: 0.5)
Upper bounds for single measures 
(mio. €)
Lower bounds for single measures 
(mio. €)
Source: own illustration and calculations Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 7 
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uses more grassland. At a lower bound of 5,000 ha grass-
land use, M2 receives 2.71 Mio. € and M4 receives 5.02 
Mio. €. Hence, co-financing in the EU system not only 
increases the financing of agri-environmental measures, but 
leads to more measures being financed. 
After the Luxembourg decisions new co-financing scenar-
ios arise, as the Communitys’ contribution to agri-environ-
mental programmes was raised by 10%, i.e., to 85% in 
“objective 1 regions” and to 60% in the other regions. In 
the following, the consequences of this new level of co-
financing for Saxony-Anhalt will be analysed in two differ-
ent scenarios: in scenario A, 
Saxony-Anhalt keeps its status as 
an “objective 1 region”, whereas in 
scenario B Saxony-Anhalt loses 
this status. Additionally, a lump-
sum scenario is calculated assum-
ing a situation in which Saxony-
Anhalt receives the budget volume 
of the reference situation 
(48.08 Mio. €) as a lump-sum. For 
analysing the scenarios, the coeffi-
cients of the regional budget re-
striction have to be adjusted re-
spectively. In the lump-sum sce-
nario the coefficients of the re-
gional budget are set to 1. The 
coefficients of scenario A and B 
are displayed in table 2. 
In scenario A the EU co-financing 
share is 85%. The MSL measures 
are additionally co-financed from 
the federation by 60%; hence, only 
6% of the total expenditures for M1 
to M4 have to be covered from the 
regional budget. The higher level 
of co-financing in this scenario 
lowers the difference of external 
co-financing between MSL and 
other measures from 15 to 9 per-
centage points as compared to the 
reference situation (compare with 
table 1, row 8). For sce-
nario B, the loss of “objec-
tive 1” status, the coeffi-
cients are calculated re-
spectively. In this case, the 
difference of external co-
financing between MSL 
and other measures rises 
from 15 to 24 percentage 
points. All other parame-
ters remain unchanged in 
the scenarios and equal 
those of table 1. Figure 3 
displays the resulting 
budget allocations. In addi-
tion, table 3 shows the use 
of resources. 
In scenario A, the EU 
budget increases by 19.821 
Mio. €, while the federal 
budget decreases by 2.159 Mio. € in comparison to the 
reference situation. The overall budget rises by 17.662 Mio. 
€ to 65.742 Mio. €, while the regional budget remains con-
stant at 7.734 Mio. €. Due to the higher level of EU co-
financing after the Luxembourg decisions, the losses of 
external grants for each regional Euro going into other 
measures than to MSL measures are reduced. Hence, the 
opportunity costs for shifting money to VNS measures 
decrease. Therefore, 4.94 Mio. € from M3 go into the VNS 
measures M6, M8, and M9. The budget of M6, which has 
higher objective coefficients than M3 (table 1, row 4 and 5), 
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Figure 2.   Budget allocation without co-financing 
 Optimal allocation
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Source: own calculation 
Table 2.   Coefficients of the regional budget restriction after the Luxembourg 
decisions; scenario A – retaining “objective 1 status” and  
scenario B – loosing “objective 1 status” 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
Scenario  A  0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
Scenario  B  0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 
Source: own calculations 
Table 3.   Budgetary resources in the scenarios and reference situation 








Reference Situation  7.734 Mio. €  36.060 Mio. €  4.286 Mio. €  48.080 Mio. € 
Scenario A  7.734 Mio. €  55.881 Mio. €  2.127 Mio. €  65.742 Mio. € 
Scenario B   7.734 Mio. €  24.436 Mio. €  8.556 Mio. €  40.726 Mio. € 
Scenario: Lump-sum  48.080 Mio. €  0.000 Mio. €  0.000 Mio. €  48.080 Mio. € 
Source: own calculations Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 7 
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is increased by 9.49 Mio. €. M8 now receives a budget of 
5.11 Mio. € and M9 of 8 Mio. €, as the upper bound for 
grassland is binding and these measures do not use any 
grassland (table 1, row 9). 
In scenario B, the overall budget decreases by 7.354 Mio. €, 
while the regional budget of Saxony-Anhalt again remains 
constant. This change of the amount of external funding 
results from a decrease of the EU budget by 11.624 Mio. € 
and an increase of the federal budget by 4.270 Mio. €. In 
comparison to the reference situation, the budget of M6 
decreases by 14.430 Mio. €, while the budget of M3 in-
creases by 4.430 Mio. € and the budget of M1 increases by 
2.650 Mio. €. In this situation the importance of MSL 
measures rises, as the federation is co-financing 60% of the 
regional share for MSL measures. The previously financed 
M6 becomes too costly and is substituted by MSL measures 
even though these measures have lower objective coeffi-
cients (table 1, row 4 and 5). 
As a result, Saxony-Anhalt is faced with two opposite stra-
tegic options arising for the case that the “objective 1” 
status is kept or lost after the decisions of Luxembourg. If 
the federal state retains “objective 1” status, VNS measures 
would gain priority. If the “objective 1” status is lost, MSL 
measures would be strengthened diminishing the decline of 
external EU co-financing. 
In the lump-sum scenario, there are only four 
measures in the optimal solution of the pro-
gramming approach - M2, M3, M4 and M6. 
Compared to the reference situation, the 
budget of M3 is reduced by 5.49 Mio. €, the 
budgets of M5 and M7 are reduced to zero, 
while the budget of M6 is increased by 9.49 
Mio. €. The result indicates that in the ab-
sence of any co-financing scheme M6 would 
receive the highest priority as compared to the 
measures M3, M5 and M7. 
4. Multi-level co-financing   
 distortions 
It has been shown in the last chapter that   
a multi-level co-financing scheme has a 
strong impact on the regional budget alloca-
tion. In order to examine the relationship 
between the co-financing level and the budget 
allocation more closely, a parameterisation   
of the EU co-financing level is carried out 
comparing the results with the budget alloca-
tions of a respective lump-sum scenario with 
the same total budget volume. This compari-
son allows to assess the distortions of the 
current multi-level co-financing system. For 
this purpose, we parameterise the level of EU 
co-financing between 0% and 100%. We 
proceed by gradually changing the coeffi-
cients of the regional budget (table 1, row 8) 
in steps between 0 and 1 for M5 and VNS 
measures. Respectively, the coefficients are 
changed between 0 and 0,4 for MSL meas-
ures, corresponding to a co-financing level 
from the EU between 0% and 100%. For each 
level of EU co-financing a lump-sum scenario 
is calculated with an equivalent overall budget. In the   
lump-sum scenarios the coefficients of the regional budget 
are set to 1. 
Figure 4 displays the resulting budgets at every EU co-
financing level and for the respective lump-sum scenario. 
The figure shows that there is no difference in the budget 
volumes for the measures M2, M4, M8, and M9 between 
the co-financing and the lump-sum scenario. M2 receives 
the budget volume of the upper bound (6 Mio. €) at any 
level of EU co-financing and the respective lump-sum. M4 
does not reach the upper bound at lower levels of EU co-
financing and the lump-sum scenario, due to the lower 
bound for grassland use of 20,000 ha (compare with the 
results of figure 2). Above a 20% EU co-financing level 
and the respective lump-sum financial volume, M4 is fully 
financed at the upper bound. The reasons for the high prior-
ity of M2 and M4 in both scenarios are the high objective 
coefficients. 
Despite the lowest objective coefficients, M8 and M9 are 
financed at high levels of EU co-financing and the respec-
tive lump-sum scenario. These measures are the only ones 
not using any grassland; hence, above about 80% of EU co-
financing and the respective lump-sum volume they receive 
the additional financial volume, as the upper bound for 
grassland is binding. 
Figure 3.   Difference of the budget allocation to the reference 
situation in the considered scenarios 
Scenario A: Difference to reference situation
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Lump-sum scenario: Difference to reference situation
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9.49 
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For the measures M1, M3, M5, M6, and M7 there is a dif-
ference in funding between the co-financing and the lump-
sum scenarios. M5 and M7 are not financed for lower 
budget volumes in both scenarios. They switch to the upper 
bound above about 50% EU co-financing level, whereas the 
same switch occurs under lump-sum scenarios only at 
higher financial volumes. The figure shows a similar pic-
ture for M6. Therefore, for these measures the multi-level 
co-financing system increases the incentives at lower budg-
ets. With respect to M1 and M3 these measures would not 
be financed at all (M1) or at lower levels (M3) under the 
lump-sum scenarios, whereas they receive a considerable 
priority under the co-financing scenarios for specific co-
financing levels. M1, thus, receives a budget between about 
40% and 70% of EU co-financing. For M3, from a EU co-
financing level from about 
20% to 80%, the budget is 
raised to the upper bound of 
15 Mio. €. 
In order to analyse the inter-
relations between the meas-
ures more closely, figure 5 
illustrates the parameterisa-
tion of the EU co-financing 
level and of the correspond-
ing lump-sum scenario of 
selected measures within one 
diagram. M2, M4, M8, and 
M9 are not displayed in this 
figure, as there is no differ-
ence in the budgets measures 
between the co-financing 
and the lump-sum scenario. 
The budgets of the remain-
ing five measures are repre-
sented in per cent of the 
respective upper bounds. 
For the co-financing sce-
nario, the figure shows a 
clear trade-off between the 
VNS measure M6 on the one 
hand and the MSL measures 
M1 and M3 on the other 
hand in the range of about 
55% to 80% of EU co-
financing level. Starting 
from a 55% EU co-financing 
level, with increasing exter-
nal funding M3 is substi-
tuted by M6. For M5 and 
M7 there is no trade-off with 
respect to the other measures 
and between the measures 
themselves and the picture is 
more simple. As discussed 
for figure 4, these measures 
switch from zero to a 100% 
financing level at around 
50% EU co-financing. 
The results of the lump-sum 
parameterisation also show a 
clear trade-off between M6 
and M3 but this trade-off already occurs at lower financial 
volumes. M6 starts to be financed with a total financial 
budget of about 22 Mio. € and above. When the measure 
reaches its upper bound at a total financial volume of about 
45 Mio. €, M3 starts to be financed again and M5 and M7 
are financed as well. 
In order to analyse to what extent the multi-level co-financing 
system distorts the financing of measures as compared to an 
equivalent lump-sum scenario, figure 6 displays the values 
of the objective function for both scenarios at different co-
financing levels and lump-sum financial volumes respec-
tively. 
As can be seen in figure 6, the values of the objective func-
tion are lower under the co-financing scenario than under 
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68,6 52,9 40,7 32,2 24,2 19 ,3
Level of lump-sum
Budget volume (mio. €) subject 
to the level of EU co-financing (%)
Budget volume (mio. €) subject 
to the level of EU lump-sum (mio. €)
M1   General extensive grassland use 
M2   Specific extensive grassland use - sheep 
M3   Specific extensive grassland use - cattle 
M4   Organic farming 
M5   Special cultures 
M6   Management of grassland 
M7   Management of ancient orchards 
M8   Management of cropland 
M9   Management of set aside land 
Source: own calculations Agrarwirtschaft 56 (2007), Heft 7 
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the lump-sum scenario in the interval between about 20% 
and 80% of EU co-financing. At low and at high levels of 
external grants there is no difference in the budget alloca-
tion between the lump-sum and the co-financing scenarios, 
as the bias in favour to MSL measures is only relevant 
within the range between about 20% and 80% EU co-
financing. At high EU co-financing levels the difference in 
co-financing between MSL and VNS measures becomes so 
small, that there is no distortion under the co-financing 
scenario. At low financial volumes, the lower bound for 
grassland causes the same choice of measures for both 
scenarios; and there is no distortion in the multi-level co-
financing system. 
The findings show that budget allocation and priority set-
ting for the agri-environmental programme in Saxony-
Anhalt would be different and would lead to higher “objec-
tive achievement”, if Saxony-Anhalt received federal and 
EU grants as a lump-sum. In the case study considered, the 
difference in the values of the objective function between 
the EU co-financing system and the lump-sum scenarios 
would amount to up to 6% for an EU co-financing level of 
60%. Hence, the objective achievement 
could be increased by this amount in an 
undistorted financing system. This is con-
siderable, but not as high as might have 
been expected. This is mainly due to the 
specific restrictions in the case study, like 
the upper bounds and grassland restric-
tions, and the objective coefficients as-
sumed. 
5. Conclusions 
The influence of different mixed co-
financing schemes on regional policy-
making has been considered exemplarily 
using the results of an interactive pro-
gramming approach for the case of design-
ing the agri-environmental programme of 
Saxony-Anhalt. The implications of co-
financing have been discussed for several 
policy scenarios. 
First, the current EU co-financing system 
for agri-environmental programmes cer-
tainly provides an extended financial budget for these pro-
grammes. 
Second, the mixed co-financing changes priority setting and 
the allocation of funds between measures. It is obvious that 
a region can maximise benefits from external grants by 
shifting money into measures with higher external co-
financing levels. Furthermore, the results draw a more de-
tailed picture showing that the impact of mixed co-
financing in the German system on regional policy-making 
will decline when the EU co-financing level is increased, 
due to a reduced difference of the external co-financing 
level between measures. Respectively, the impact increases 
when the EU co-financing level is reduced. For the case of 
Saxony-Anhalt two opposite strategic options were dis-
cussed. If the “objective 1” status is lost, MSL measures 
gain a higher priority. If on the other hand Saxony-Anhalt 
retains the “objective 1” status, VNS measures gain a 
higher priority due to an increased co-financing level. 
Third, if Saxony-Anhalt receives EU and federal grants as a 
lump-sum, giving the chance of undistorted policy deci-
sion-making, the values of the objective function are higher 
in all scenarios than with co-financing. 
It can be assumed that local actors have a good 
knowledge about the impact of agri-environmental 
measures in a region and also better represent local 
preferences for the provision of public goods than 
upper political levels. Therefore, the lump-sum sce-
nario shows a best and undistorted allocation of funds 
from a regional point of view. The results are congru-
ent with the principle of “fiscal equivalence” and the 
demand for extended and unbiased local responsibil-
ity (OSTERBURG and STRATMANN, 2002: 276). The 
case study of the agri-environmental programme of 
Saxony-Anhalt underlines the general problem of 
decision-making and co-financing in a multi-level 
political system (OATES, 1999: 1122). 
The model used for the case study in Saxony-Anhalt 
reflects the specific conditions and constraints of this 
region. The strength of the interactive programming 
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approach is to support decision-making in a straightforward 
and transparent way, using knowledge and assumptions of 
actors and decision-makers. The approach could be ad-
justed and extended for other case studies according to the 
needs of relevant decision-makers. 
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